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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to consider how the regulation of banks has developed since the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the challenges which are now facing the regulators. The lessons 
learned from the crisis must not be forgotten. However, political pressures are giving rise to 
calls for deregulation and emerging technological challenges confront the regulators. 
 
Introduction 
The regulation of banks is a difficult and high profile task. The banking industry is a complex 
one which plays a fundamental role in the United Kingdom’s economy.348 The financial crisis 
highlighted the importance of countries having a regulatory regime which can maintain the 
health and stability of the banking sector. Banks provide payment and funding services which 
are central to the successful operation of a modern economy.  Regulation therefore needs to 
ensure that a banking sector is healthy. This article will describe the features of the UK’s post-
crisis regulatory approach, and will then consider the new challenges which banking 
regulators in the UK (and many other countries) are facing. 
 
The modern regulatory approach in the UK 
It is not surprising that banking regulation in the UK has undergone significant changes since 
the financial crisis of 2008. The UK suffered badly, as two of the largest banking groups had 
to be bailed out by the government and several smaller banks failed. The Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), the industry regulator at the time, was widely criticised for failing to 
anticipate the crisis and minimise its consequences.   
 
In the period since 2008 attention has shifted somewhat from prudential to conduct issues as 
a result of UK banks being embroiled in high profile misconduct situations concerning: the 
misselling of payment protection insurance and interest rate hedging products; the 
manipulation of LIBOR and foreign exchange markets, and money laundering.  
 
The headline reform in the years since the crisis has been the changes to the regulatory 
structure introduced by the Financial Services Act 2012.  This measure amended the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) by replacing the FSA, the former sole regulator, with 
a ‘twin peaks’ regulatory model consisting of two new regulatory bodies (the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA), which is part of the Bank of England, and the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA)). 
 
Yet, these well-known reforms to the structure of financial services regulation are only part of 
the picture. Less well appreciated are the changes which have taken place in the approach 
adopted by the regulators. There are several distinctive features of the post-crisis regulatory 
approach. 
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Proactive regulation and supervision 
The most important development has been the emphasis which the regulators now placed on 
proactive regulation and supervision, the aim to be forward looking and pre-emptive. The 
intention is that the regulators should be able to identify and eliminate problems before they 
can cause significant consumer or market detriment: ‘prevention is better than a cure’.349 The 
theory is that a problem such as payment protection insurance would now be identified and 
eliminated well before it could grow into a major misselling scandal. 
 
The impact of proactive supervision can be seen. On the prudential side, the PRA has been 
working on improving the stability and resilience of banking institutions in order to enable 
them to better withstand future economic shocks. Examples of such work include: addressing 
problems with capital and liquidity requirements,350 introducing stress testing,351 and 
developing the resolvability of banking institutions.352 For example, press reports have stated 
that the PRA has drawn up contingency plans to meet the Cooperative Bank’s funding 
problem, which include an orderly winding up of the business, should it be unsuccessful in its 
search for new sources of capital.353 In terms of stress testing, banks operating in the UK have 
been asked to ensure that they have contingency plans in place to enable them to cope with 
the whole range of possible scenarios which Brexit may produce.354 On the conduct side, more 
rigorous supervision by the FCA has placed great emphasis on ensuring that firms have strong 
risk management frameworks in place and pay greater attention to the needs of their 
customers. The FCA has also undertaken work on subjects such as mortgages,355 credit card 
debt356 and payday lending357 with the aim of reducing the risks that practices in these areas 
might create. In relation to interest only mortgages, the result was that over two and a half 
million customers were contacted by mortgage providers to be asked whether they had a 
repayment strategy.358 The proactive approach can also be seen in the way in which the 
regulators are playing an active role in the development of Financial Services Technology 
(FinTech) and in moves to ensure IT resilience and to counter cybercrime. 
 
Judgement, risk and outcomes based supervision 
Another aspect of modern supervision can be seen in the FCA’s statement that its current 
approach is a ‘judgement based’ one.359  Judgement based supervision can be seen as a reaction 
against the mechanistic ‘light touch’ ‘tick box’ form of regulation centring on systems and 
processes which is regarded as having failed to identify the problems that were developing in 
the sector prior to 2008.360 Regulators are expected to consider actively the issues confronting 
banks rather than simply conducting a limited box ticking exercise. This approach is coupled 
with an emphasis on outcomes which reduces the risk that regulation becomes a meaningless 
exercise in box ticking and leaves firms with discretion as to how they achieve the required 
outcomes. This creates scope for banks to develop innovative techniques whilst still satisfying 
the regulators.361 It recognises the fact that the sector being supervised is both diverse and 
                                               
349 FCA Annual Report 2013-14, p 5. 
350 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/supervision/banking/capitalliquidity.aspx. 
351 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fpc/stresstest.aspx. 
352 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/supervision/banking/recoveryresolution.aspx. Resolvability refers to the 
process of winding up failing banks. 
353 B Marlow, Officials draw up rescue plan for Co-op Bank, The Telegraph, 18th March 2017.  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/03/18/officials-draw-rescue-plan-co-op-bank/. 
354 Bank of England, News Release 22nd March 2017. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2017/008.pdf. 
355 FCA, Embedding the Mortgage Market Review: Responsible Lending Review, Thematic Review, TR 16/4, 2016.  See the FCA’s 
Mortgages and Home Finance: Conduct of Business Sourcebook (MCOBS). 
356 FCA, Consultation on persistent debt and earlier intervention remedies CP17/10, 3rd April 2017. 
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Consumer Credit Sourcebook (CONC) Chapter 5A. 
358 FCA, Annual Report 2013-14, p 7. 
359 FCA, Annual Report 2015-16, p. 11. 
360 FSA, The Turner Review:A Regulatory response to the Global Banking Crisis, 2009, pp 86-9. 
361 Financial Services Authority, Principles-based regulation Focusing on the outcomes that matter. 2007, p 6. 
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dynamic: ‘one size fits all’ regulation cannot hope to cope with the wide variety of firms 
operating in the financial services sector.362  
 
Given the size of the sector being supervised, it is essential that the regulator uses its 
judgement to prioritise its work in order to achieve the most effective results. The supervisory 
model therefore aims to be risk based and proportionate in that it concentrates resources on 
those firms, products and services which create the greatest risk. To achieve these aims, the 
regulator needs to have a good understanding of regulated firms’ business models and 
strategies as well as the external economic context in which they are operating. This requires 
it to have sufficient specialism amongst its staff and knowledge of the businesses being 
supervised to enable it to intervene effectively at an appropriate time, such as when a product 
is being brought onto the market.  The aim to reduce, if not eliminate, risk is an essential 
component of this form of supervision. 
 
The modern system is also one of meta-regulation. This means that it is accepted that 
responsibility for much of the day to day regulation of the industry must be placed on those 
being regulated.363 In practice, the regulators lack the resources to undertake detailed 
regulation of all firms within their remit and must therefore rely on the industry to police its 
staff.  In WH Ireland Limited364 the FCA stated that: 
 
‘The first line of defence in the fight against market abuse is the systems and controls 
that firms have in place to protect against, detect and help prevent it, including 
comprehensive compliance oversight, robust governance, and adequate training.’ 
 
It is not surprising that it follows that the FCA tends to be highly critical of firms which are 
found to have inadequate lines of defence in place.  In WH Ireland Limited a penalty of £1.2 
million was imposed on the firm on the ground of failings in this regard. 
 
Principles based regulation 
The modern regulatory approach applied by the FCA is based on high level ‘Principles’. The 
use of such principles means that the regulator does not need to develop detailed rules of 
conduct for each of the sectors of the industry which are regulated.365 Black, in her work on the 
crash,366 argues that it is a mistake to equate ‘Principles based’ with ‘Light touch’ regulation 
and states that Principles Based Regulation ‘is in practice a collation of strategies which can 
be applied with varying degrees of intensity.’367 That is undoubtedly correct. Modern practice 
points strongly to the current picture being one of ‘Principles based, but intrusive’368 regulation, 
at least in relation to the largest banks. It is the mode of implementation by the regulator which 
is critical. 
 
Reliance on specific Principles for Businesses369 dominates the FCA’s enforcement work and 
has allowed it to take action in circumstances where no specific rules existed to govern a 
particular activity.370 Principle 3, which requires a firm to take reasonable care to organise and 
control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems, is the 
principle commonly invoked in such cases. It was, for example, used in the decisions 
                                               
362 HM Treasury, A new approach to financial regulation: judgement, focus and stability, Cm 7874, July 2010, para 1.7.  The 
FCA currently supervises over 56,000 firms, 18,000 of which are also regulated prudentially by the FCA.. FCA, Our Mission 2017, 
p 5. 
363 I Chiu, Regulating (From) the Inside,2015, Hart Publishing, p 14-15. 
364 FCA Final Notice, WH Ireland Limited, 23rd February 2016. 
365 FCA, Our Mission 2017, p 6. 
366 J. Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis (2012) 75(6) MLR 1037. 
367 Ibid p 1044. 
368 The FSA referred to its post-crash approach to supervising conduct risks as ‘intensive and intrusive.’ FSA Final Notice, Bank 
of Scotland Plc, 23rd May 2011, para 4.4. 
369 The FCA Handbook creates eleven Principles for Businesses.  They are set out in PRIN 2.1.1R. The PRA Handbook contains 
eight Fundamental Rules. There is considerable overlap. The PRA rules omit the customer facing ones in the FCA list. 
370 For a full discussion of the role of principle based regulation, see J. Black, M. Hopper & C. Band, Making a success of Principles-
based regulation (2007) 1:3, Law and Financial Markets Review, 191-206. 
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concerning manipulation of the foreign exchange and LIBOR markets which were outside of 
the regulatory scheme at the time that the conduct occurred.371 
 
Behavioural Influences 
The regulatory approach also has a new element to it: the incorporation of behavioural 
economics. This reflects the way in which the understanding of decision making has changed. 
Prior to the crisis, it was believed that consumers and market actors were rational individuals, 
making rational decisions on the basis of the information available to them. The financial crisis 
highlighted that in relation to financial services, this is not always the case.372 Different 
motivations can impact how individuals make decisions. This has resulted in both the FCA 
and the PRA looking to other fields of scholarship, including behavioural economics and 
psychology, in order to improve the regulatory approach. The literature in this area 
emphasises the impact of biases on decision making.373 Individuals might have a preference for 
a particular product or service on the basis of past experience: existing beliefs (such as being 
overly confident of their own ability) can impact how individuals view different options. 
Decision making itself can be affected by different skills, expectations and even existing ‘rules 
of thumb’ (heuristics).374 As a result an optimal decision may not be reached. These insights 
are being used to guide regulatory and supervisory processes. 
 
Essentially, the work in this area has two strands: using these new insights to improve the 
understanding of how consumers and market participants make decisions, and to improve the 
quality of decisions made by regulators.  
 
The FCA first set out their approach to using behavioural economics in an occasional paper, 
published in 2013.375 The overarching thinking behind this approach is that: ‘If regulators are 
to make markets work better, we [the FCA] need to understand whatever materially drives the 
equilibria we observe. In particular the decisions that firms, consumers and, of course, 
regulators take.’376 Understanding how these behaviours can change the decision making 
process therefore puts the FCA in a stronger position to ensure that consumer protection 
policies are designed appropriately377 and to make sure that biases are not exploited to cause 
consumer detriment.378 It also enables the FCA to understand why those operating in markets 
make choices, and enables the regulators to be aware of the reasons they themselves might 
come to particular decisions. Such understanding can result in improved decisions. This new 
addition of behavioural understanding therefore informs the work conducted by the 
regulatory authorities at each stage of the regulatory and oversight process. As the FCA has 
noted, behavioural economics is now ‘embedded into traditional regulatory analysis: so to 
some extent it flies under the radar.’379 
 
Within the Bank of England, improved understanding of the impact of biases is being 
incorporated into day to day operations. The Bank indicated its intention to utilise literature 
from the field of psychology to improve their decision making processes in their Strategic Plan 
                                               
371 e.g. FCA, Final Notice, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, 11th November 2014. These benchmarks have been regulated since 
2015. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, Schedule 5. 
372 M Wheatley, Human face of regulation, speech at the London School of Economics, 10th April 2013 
373 The insights build on the scholarship of academics such as D Kahneman, who describes the basic psychological model in 
Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin, 2012), and R H Thaler, whose work on the development of behavioural economics is 
summarised in Misbehaving (Penguin, 2015). 
374 For an overview of the biases identified by the FCA as impacting consumer decision making, see: FCA, Occasional Paper No 1: 
Applying behavioural economics at the Financial Conduct Authority, 2013, p 16-19 
375 Ibid. 
376 P Andrews, ‘Beyond economics?’, speech at conference on behavioural finance held by Queen Mary University of London 
School of Business, Lancaster Business School and Santa Clara University, 14th June 2016. 
https://www.fca.org.uk/insight/speech-beyond-economics   
377 See E Costa et al, Applying behavioural insights to regulated markets. A Behavioural Insights Team report for Citizens Advice 
(2016). http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/consumer-affairs/applying-behavioural-insights-to-regulated-markets/. 
378 See, for example, FCA, Our Mission 2017, April 2017, p 22 
379 M Wheatley, ‘Making competition king – the rise of behavioural economics at the FCA’, Speech at the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, 25th March 2014. https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/making-competition-king-
%E2%80%93-rise-behavioural-economics-fca  
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in 2014,380 acknowledging the potential for biases affecting PRA supervisory decisions. The 
Bank’s Chief Economist, Andrew Haldane, has also highlighted the biases that can affect the 
way that the Bank conducts its responsibilities. To some extent, this is to minimise the 
potential for ‘groupthink’ affecting decision-making, yet it must also be acknowledged that 
‘groupthink’ is not the only psychological phenomenon that can detrimentally affect decision 
making. The Bank is slowly recognising that they need to be open to challenge if they are to 
operate successfully in accordance with their statutory objectives.381 
 
The Bank also expects firms to take this approach into account when assessing their 
governance requirements and the organisation of their senior management: the negative 
impact of over-confidence (or hubris) within firms, on their culture, and on the decisions they 
make has been highlighted by the Bank.382 This understanding is all the more important given 
the emphasis placed on firms’ culture after the financial crisis. 
 
Individual responsibility and culture 
In accordance with the focus on culture, measures have also been taken with a view to 
strengthening the accountability of individuals working in banks: the regulatory framework 
governing those working in banks has been revised and the FCA has shown an increased 
willingness to take enforcement action against individuals.383 These developments are 
intended to improve the culture within the industry. The logic is that it is the senior 
management within banks who set the culture of the institution and that misconduct usually 
has its roots in cultural problems. It is, for example, hoped that customers will receive a better 
level of service if bank staff are moved away from ‘bonus’ or ‘sales’ cultures. ‘Firms need to 
have a culture that focuses on customers and integrity.’384  
 
At the centre of this development is the replacement of the former Approved Persons Regime 
by the new Senior Managers and Certification Regimes,385 overseen by both the PRA and the 
FCA. There is now a defined list of key roles within a bank.386 Banks are required to supply the 
regulators with a responsibilities map detailing the firm’s managerial structure and the names 
of the senior managers who are undertaking those key roles.387 The regulators approve those 
individuals as suitable to undertake those functions.  Under a new section 66A(5) of FSMA388 
senior managers bear personal responsibility for failures within the part of the firm they are 
managing. A breach of these responsibilities can lead to the appropriate regulator taking 
action against the senior manager. It is intended that this individual responsibility should lead 
to managers driving improvements in the culture of firms.  It is also hoped that the new system 
will overcome the difficulty which was highlighted by reports into the HBOS389 and RBS390 
failures of attributing personal responsibility for misconduct to the highest level of 
management.  
 
                                               
380 Bank of England, ‘News Release – Bank of England launches strategic plan’, 18th March 2014. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2014/058.aspx. See also: A Haldane, ‘Central Bank Psychology’, 17th 
November 2014. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech776.pdf  
381 See: H Powley, ‘Culture in the banking regulators: the need for challenge’, University of Bristol Law School Blog, 21st November 
2016. http://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2016/11/culture-in-the-banking-regulators-the-need-for-challenge/  
382 A Bailey, ‘Culture in financial services – a regulator’s perspective’, Speech given at the City Week 2016 Conference, 19th May 
2016 
383 FCA Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15, p. 13. 
384 Ibid, p 29.  
385 See: Bank of England, ‘Strengthening Accountability’, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/supervision/strengtheningacc/default.aspx; and FCA, ‘Senior Managers and 
Certification Regime’, https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/senior-managers-certification-regime   
386 FSMA s 59ZB. 
387 FSMA s 60. 
388 This provision derives from section 29 of the Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016. 
389 Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority, Report into the FSA’s enforcement actions following the failure of HBOS, 
by A Green QC, 2015, p 6. 
390 FSA, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 2011, p 7-8. 
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The Certification Regime applies to staff, other than senior managers, whose role within a 
bank could pose a risk of significant harm to the firm or any of its customers.391  Such persons, 
examples given include staff who give investment advice to customers or administer 
benchmarks, no longer require PRA/FCA approval in order to undertake their work. It will be 
for their firms, rather than the regulators, to certify that they are fit and proper to conduct 
their roles. They are, however, obliged to comply with the FCA’s Individual Conduct Rules392 
and can therefore be subjected to penalties following enforcement action for a breach of those 
rules. 
 
Developing challenges 
There is a widespread consensus that the changes which have been made have resulted in the 
UK having a banking system which is more capable of withstanding any economic shocks 
which may assail it. When the outcome of the UK’s referendum on leaving the EU (the ‘Brexit 
vote’) was declared the Bank of England swiftly issued a press release.393 This emphasised that 
the Bank had previously put contingency plans in place to deal with any adverse market 
reaction following from the vote, and that changes introduced since the crisis had resulted in 
a much more robust and resilient financial sector which, in comparison to the position in 
2008, possessed greatly increased levels of capital and liquidity. 
 
However, the position faced by the banking sector is not a static one: it is nearly ten years since 
the crisis unfolded. Banking regulators need to be alert to the emergence of new challenges as 
they continue to deal with the problems highlighted by the financial and conduct crises. The 
picture in 2017 is one of an emerging tension between, on the one hand, the desire to maintain 
the additional security built into the financial system by the regulatory changes made since 
2008 and, on the other, calls to lessen the regulatory burden with a view to increasing the 
returns made by the industry. This tension is emerging against a background of political 
uncertainty and an industry which is undergoing rapid change as a result of technological 
developments. 
 
Challenges: the political backdrop and deregulation394 
First, the broader political backdrop needs to be considered. The regulation of banks is a 
matter of political concern. If this had moved out of the minds of politicians in the years before 
the financial crisis, the experience of 2008 emphasised the importance of the banking industry 
to the health of a country’s economy. As a result, banking regulation has been in the spotlight 
in the years after the crisis. That is still the case today. Recent political events have returned 
the question of banking regulation to the forefront of the debate.  
 
The UK has entered a period of uncertainty, with the triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union indicating the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU.395 With the political 
blustering around the issue, it is, as yet, unclear how Brexit will impact the operation of 
banking regulation in the UK: particularly in relation to UK licensed banks having access to 
the EU’s single market. There are indications, however, that it may result in significant 
upheaval within the UK banking sector. Numerous banking institutions have indicated that 
they have either drawn up, or started to initiate, contingency plans to minimise the impact of 
Brexit on their operations by repositioning themselves outside of the UK. HSBC was the first 
bank to announce that it is considering the relocation of 1,000 staff. Goldman Sachs have 
announced396 that they have drawn up contingency plans to move business out of London in 
                                               
391 FSMA s 63E(1).  
392 FCA Handbook, COCON 2.1  
393 Bank of England Governor Mark Carney’s statement following EU referendum result - 24 June 2016, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2016/056.pdf. 
394 S Brush and A Weber, How Trump and Brexit Could Change Global Bank Rules, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-28/how-trump-and-brexit-could-change-global-bank-rules. 
395 See: ‘Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50’, 29th March 2017 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_Europe
an_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf. 
396 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/may/05/brexit-city-goldman-sachs-lloyd-blankfein-london-uk. 
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the event that the Brexit negotiations do not go well. JP Morgan397 and Deutsche Bank398 are 
other examples of banks that have announced plans to relocate staff from London offices to 
different sites in Europe, depending on the outcome of the negotiations.  
 
The declaration of these contingency plans reflects the Bank of England’s requirement for 
banks to have clear formulations of their post-Brexit options. This illustrates the Bank’s 
concerns surrounding the potential for market instability arising from Brexit and the 
possibility of an outcome whereby the UK does not reach a deal with the EU on the terms of 
the its exit. The PRA, has warned banks that they must be prepared for a situation where the 
‘UK and EU do not reach agreement on issues such as implementation periods, mutual 
recognition of standards, and co-operation in financial regulation or supervision’,399 
emphasising the importance of ensuring the safety and soundness of their operations in 
accordance with the PRA’s statutory objective. Brexit introduces considerable threats for the 
operation of the UK’s banking sector. 
 
However, financial instability is not the only threat currently facing regulators as a result of 
the Brexit-focused political backdrop. A significant amount of work will need to be conducted 
to detangle UK and EU regulation, and to incorporate revised rules into the UK’s regime, 
regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. The FCA will work with HM Treasury and the 
Bank of England in this regard to minimise disruption to the UK’s financial sector.400  This is 
going to be important work. It will also be time consuming and potentially politically 
contentious. The FCA and the PRA need to ensure that they balance their responsibilities 
appropriately. There could be periods when there are risks to their statutory objectives, and 
the regulators will need to work to minimise these. It is also possible that the demands of the 
Brexit work will move into the forefront, and over-shadow other responsibilities held by the 
regulators in terms of day-to-day supervision of the banking sector. Whilst Brexit will be 
important and needs to be prioritised to ensure the continued functioning of the UK’s financial 
services market, regulators need to make sure that they do not fall foul of the problems that 
plagued their predecessor and place too much emphasis on one area of responsibility over 
others.  
 
Further, there are increasing possibilities that the UK might move towards deregulation. A 
2015 Treasury publication focused on addressing the UK’s ‘productivity puzzle’,401 highlighted 
the belief that there should be ‘open and competitive markets with the minimum of regulation’, 
and noted that ‘there is no room for complacency in pushing for ever greater consumer power, 
nor in fighting stifling regulation’.402 Brexit is considered by some to be an opportunity ‘for the 
UK to deregulate and stimulate growth’.403 David Davis MP, the Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union, has referred to ‘needless and restrictive regulation’ in an article 
published on the Conservative Home website.404 Prominent members of the ‘Leave’ campaign 
have hailed the process of the UK leaving the EU as an opportunity for the UK to reduce the 
                                               
397 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/may/03/jp-morgan-jobs-uk-brexit-dublin-frankfurt-luxembourg. 
398 https://www.ft.com/content/b950b28c-2a9e-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c. 
399 The PRA’s ‘Dear CEO’ letter is available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/about/letter070417.pdf?utm_source=Bank+of+England+updates&utm_ca
mpaign=1631555701-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_04_06&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_556dbefcdc-1631555701-
113379485. See also: ‘Bank of England tells City to prepare better for ‘no-deal’ Brexit’, https://www.ft.com/content/3cc18680-
1b74-11e7-a266-12672483791a. 
400 FCA, ‘Business Plan 2017-18’, p 15. 
401 HM Treasury, ‘Fixing the foundations: creating a more prosperous nation’, Cm 9098, July 2015 
402 Ibid 12. 
403 FT.com, ‘Big Bang II: After Brexit, what’s next for the City of London?’, https://www.ft.com/content/bf2a2c16-6eb4-11e6-
a0c9-1365ce54b926; Risk.net, ‘Brexit and financial regulation: a delicate negotiation’, 
http://www.risk.net/regulation/3951611/brexit-and-financial-regulation-a-delicate-negotiation 
404 Although this article was originally published before David Davis’s appointment as Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, it was republished following this appointment. http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2016/07/david-davis-
trade-deals-tax-cuts-and-taking-time-before-triggering-article-50-a-brexit-economic-strategy-for-britain.html 
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extent of ‘cumbersome’ financial regulation and benefit as a result of doing so.405  Lord Lawson, 
an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, has also argued in favour of ‘intelligent deregulation’.406 
 
Within the banking sector itself, a more nuanced version of this argument has been advanced. 
Rather than outright calls for deregulation, institutions are lobbying for a lighter form of 
regulation: for regulation which is easier to comply with. Firms have complained about the 
cost of compliance, the constant iterative regulatory change,407 the time burdens associated 
with compliance and the uncertainty of regulatory developments. It has also been contended 
that firms are spending more on compliance than innovation and that the cost of compliance 
is responsible for the slow growth of productivity in the UK’s banking sector.408 However, those 
who followed the criticism of the Financial Services Authority in the years after the crisis will 
be aware of the risks of a movement towards ‘lighter’ regulation. From the regulator’s 
perspective, endorsing such an approach risks a return to those pre-crisis days, where the 
light-touch regime meant that problems developing in the financial sector went unidentified. 
Such an approach is also directly at odds with the modern, proactive, approach to financial 
supervision outlined earlier in this paper.  
 
Despite the risks that could accompany deregulation, there are still calls from sector 
representatives for a ‘smarter’ approach to the regulation of banks. These attitudes can be 
demonstrated with a quote taken from a CBI report published in October 2016: ‘The pace and 
burden of regulation change is stifling the ability of firms to dedicate meaningful resource to 
innovation, which is subsequently inflicting damage on the sector, and the wider economy, for 
the future.’409 The CBI are not calling directly for deregulation or ‘less’ regulation, but rather a 
‘stable’ regulatory regime. This reflects concerns within the sector about the pace of regulatory 
developments and the number of changes which have had to be implemented in recent years.410 
The CBI, therefore, are seeking a regime which places a greater emphasis on the UK’s global 
competitiveness.411 Indeed, they appear to be arguing that now that reforms have rendered the 
system robust and able to withstand shocks it is time for a new priority of fostering growth to 
be embraced: it is lack of growth that is the real threat to the economy in 2017.412 In a period in 
which the UK’s productivity is poor413 policies designed to foster innovation are bound to be 
attractive. 
 
The CBI is not the only industry body calling for a change to the regulatory approach. The 
British Bankers Authority (BBA), while cautious in their tone, highlight the possibilities of 
Brexit enabling the UK to ‘tailor its banking rules and regulations more specifically to the 
needs of the UK banking system’;414 the chief executive of TheCityUK, a financial services 
lobbying group, has stated that ‘there is absolutely no appetite for a regulatory bonfire. … But 
there is space for a tonal shift’.415  
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There are changing attitudes as to the nature and extent of banking regulation. There is a risk 
that the lessons learnt in 2008 are already being forgotten as the push for looser regulation 
builds strength. It has always been acknowledged that this risk exists, and yet slowly, but 
surely, the arguments advanced against regulation in the pre-crisis days are resurfacing. These 
changing attitudes, accompanied by the concerns created by Brexit, will pose a challenge for 
the future of banking regulation. There are, therefore, important questions as to the approach 
the UK government will take after Brexit. Some degree of deregulation might be seen as both 
throwing off the burdens of EU regulation in order to increase London’s competitiveness in 
global markets,416 and as a way of tempting banks to stay in the UK. This, however, doesn’t take 
the importance of equivalence with EU regulatory standards into account. The need for 
institutions based in the UK to have access to the single market may prove to be a decisive 
factor in favour of the UK maintaining regulatory equivalence with EU standards.417  
 
Global challenges 
These domestic challenges need to be set against the global political picture. There are 
increasing concerns that the consensus surrounding the need for global regulatory standards 
developed after the financial crisis is starting to break down. Central to these concerns are the 
policies proposed by the Trump Administration: to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act418 and weaken 
the regulatory regime for financial institutions in the US.419 An Executive Order,420 setting out 
the core principles for financial regulation in the US, was signed by President Trump in 
February 2017. The Executive Order emphasises the importance of a regulatory regime that 
ensures that American companies are globally competitive, and highlights the need for 
regulatory policies to be ‘appropriately tailored’. This Executive Order has initiated a review 
of US regulatory agencies and of the operation of the Dodd-Frank Act itself. The Trump 
Administration considers the Dodd-Frank Act to be an example of ‘regulatory overreach’.421  
 
The dismantling of Dodd-Frank, the removal of the protections it affords, and the potential 
impact this could have on US and global markets is concerning.422 However, there is an 
additional element in that the desire within the US to reduce the regulatory burden on US 
banking institutions could also impede the development of global standards. Since the crisis 
significant progress has been made to improve the global consensus as to international 
regulatory standards, but there are signs this momentum is beginning to stall. Changing 
standards within the US could make it difficult to achieve any further progress on global 
banking standards.423 The Systemic Risk Council (SRC) has written to G20 leaders, 
highlighting their: 
 
‘concern[ed] about the reports that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and 
even the Governors and Heads of Supervision who oversee the prudential standard 
                                               
416 H Agnew and P Jenkins, Big Bang II: After Brexit, what’s next for the City of London? The Financial Times, 1st September 
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setters, have been debating softening their plans for the final capital standards in the 
face of intense industry pressure. That would be a perilous course.’424 
 
The SRC continues: ‘Most vitally, governments and legislators should resist the siren calls of 
those who would have them reduce equity standards for big and complex firms, economize on 
liquidity requirements, retreat on central counterparties or dismantle the new resolution 
regimes’.425 The SRC is not alone in urging policymakers and regulators to resist calls to roll 
back the regulatory regime. Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, has 
emphasised the threats to global consensus on banking regulatory standards, highlighting the 
risk of ‘reform fatigue’ accompanying the possibility that the standards addressing issues such 
as institutions being too big to fail will not be completed.426  
 
Alongside concerns that global initiatives will stall, the combination of Brexit and the potential 
for a loosening of standards within the US has sparked concerns that there could be a 
regulatory ‘race to the bottom’, resulting in regulatory arbitrage between jurisdictions. Such a 
scenario would defeat the progress that has been made to address the deficiencies with 
banking regulation emphasised by the financial crisis.  
 
The combination of these pressures paints a disturbing picture in which the UK’s banking 
regulators are at risk of struggling to maintain their current approach to the oversight of 
banking institutions. Given the significant progress which has been made in strengthening the 
banking regulatory regime after the financial crisis, a weakening of the rules will threaten the 
stability of banking institutions and raise concerns for consumer protection. Failure to fully 
implement the regulatory initiatives which currently appear to be the target of those who 
favour deregulation will also raise questions about the extent of the UK’s equivalence with the 
EU’s regulatory regime, an issue that could be problematic for UK-regulated institutions 
seeking to continue to do business in the EU. This, of course, depends on the outcome of the 
Brexit negotiations.  
 
The regularity with which representatives of banking regulatory bodies are emphasising the 
importance of maintaining the post-crisis reform momentum427 illustrates the concerns that 
exist as a result of changing attitudes within the US and elsewhere towards the maintenance 
of global standards for banking regulation and the possible impacts of Brexit on one of the 
world’s leading financial markets. Global standards underpinning the global financial markets 
will come under threat if two of the world’s largest financial centres go their own way because 
of domestic political considerations. 
 
The political backdrop sets the scene for the challenges facing the future of banking regulation. 
It is clear that there is a push for a loosening of regulatory standards. Yet, at the same time 
there are developing tensions between innovation and compliance. As financial technologies 
(FinTech) grow, banks are finding themselves in a position where they need to be able to 
innovate and keep pace with institutions offering consumers a different kind of banking: 
access to products or services in a novel, more convenient or cheaper way to that offered by 
high street banks. Banks have argued that the costs of compliance are impeding their ability 
to innovate and compete. Further, innovation inevitably brings risks with it. As the Governor 
of the Bank of England has said, the Bank must work to ensure that ‘the right hard and soft 
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infrastructure are in place to allow innovation to thrive while keeping the system safe’.428 The 
threat of FinTech is not the only challenge to current banking models. The drive for increased 
competition within the UK’s banking sector has resulted in a number of ‘challenger’ banks 
seeking to attract customers from existing institutions. Technological advances are also 
introducing threats in the form of cybercrime and the risks associated with a cyber-attack. 
There are, therefore, numerous challenges for banking regulators and the banking sector, 
ahead. The next section will address these challenges in detail.  
 
Specific challenges: FinTech, Competition and Cybercrime 
FinTech 
The FinTech arena is one in which the innovation versus compliance tension is clearly 
illustrated. FinTech, or financial technology, is an area of development that has received 
significant attention in recent years. The FCA states that ‘the term that describes the 
intersection between finance and technology. It can refer to technical innovation applied in a 
traditional financial services context or to innovative financial services that disrupt the 
existing financial services market’.429 Broadly, FinTech relates to new technology that can be 
used to improve the customer experience. There are numerous firms based in the UK 
developing new technologies that can be used to improve the customer experience of the 
banking sector. Closely aligned with FinTech is RegTech, regulatory technology, defined as 
‘the adoption and use of technology to help financial services firms to understand and meet 
their regulatory requirements more efficiently or effectively’.430 Both areas have experienced a 
boom in popularity in recent years. FinTech companies attracted over £520 million in 
investment in the UK in 2015 alone.431 
 
FinTech has also been at the centre of UK political attention. Government policy aims to 
position the UK as the leading global FinTech hub,432 in part to protect the UK’s position as one 
of the world’s leading financial centres. A result of this has been the introduction of initiatives 
designed to increase the attractiveness of the UK to developers wishing to create and market 
innovative financial technology. The UK government has created a special envoy for FinTech 
in the UK, a role currently held by Eileen Burbidge, designed to ‘champion the development 
of new and innovative technologies and ideas’.433 In the 2016 Autumn Statement, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer pledged £500,000 a year for ‘FinTech specialists’ and also 
declared that the FinTech envoy system will be expanded, creating a network of regional 
FinTech representatives.434 FinTech firms could also find themselves supported by the £400 
million that the British Business Bank was granted to invest in ‘innovative firms’.435 HM 
Treasury indicated the centrality of FinTech to UK economic policy in its 2017 economic policy 
recommendation letters to the FCA436 and Prudential Regulation Committee,437 highlighting the 
importance of ensuring that market conditions allow innovative businesses to prosper. The 
UK Government hosts a yearly FinTech conference,438 and the UK has a dedicated FinTech 
week.439 The 2017 offerings are the second of each event.  
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The FinTech sector, globally, is still in its infancy. While this provides a benefit to the UK in 
terms of its ability to position itself as the leading FinTech centre, it also means that there are 
a number of challenges surrounding the operation of FinTech products and services that need 
to be understood if the sector is to be able to develop without posing a threat to the UK’s 
financial system.  
 
Proactive regulation and supervision is, of course, intended to deal with the risks which might 
be created by innovation. This is evidenced by the creation of new regulatory initiatives aimed 
at ensuring that innovation does not take place beyond regulatory controls. Separate initiatives 
have been created by the UK’s banking regulators. The FCA has introduced an ‘Innovation 
Hub’,440 forming part of ‘Project Innovate’, a project designed by the FCA to support innovative 
businesses.441 Project Innovate supports firms that are truly innovative and that aim to provide 
benefits to consumers442 by assisting them through the authorisation process, providing 
information on regulatory requirements, and, in a recent modification to the system, providing 
a point of contact within the FCA after the authorisation has been received.443  
 
This process acknowledges that attaining regulatory approval can be a time consuming, 
confusing and costly process for young firms with limited investment, and thus addresses one 
of the key problems technology firms had experienced when trying to enter the financial 
services market.444 Falling within Project Innovate is the FCA’s ‘Regulatory Sandbox’, a space 
in which approved firms can develop and test new products and services in real life situations. 
This allows firms to improve their understanding of how the product or service operates, and 
of how regulation applies to it, before offering it to the wider market. The Regulatory Sandbox 
also enables both the developer, and regulators, to identify and minimise any potential risks 
that could be created by that innovation.  
 
The FCA has stated that encouraging innovation enables it to support the public, businesses 
and economy.445 This package of measures demonstrates the FCA’s openness to innovation that 
supports consumers. This is further illustrated by the way the Regulatory Sandbox works. The 
FCA has sought to assuage fears that those using the Regulatory Sandbox will find themselves 
subject to FCA enforcement proceedings in the event that their product or service causes harm 
during the development period. Given that firms need to have FCA authorisation to use the 
Regulatory Sandbox,446 there is a risk that a breach of an FCA rule during this period could 
result in penalties. This might deter FinTech innovation in the UK. To combat this, the FCA 
emphasise the powers at their disposal to minimise the risk of this occurring. The FCA have 
the ability to issue waivers for breaches of rules (provided that the ‘waiver test’, contained in 
s.138A(4) FSMA is satisfied), and can provide firms with individualised guidance on the FCA’s 
interpretation of the rules. The FCA can also issue a ‘No enforcement letter’ indicating that it 
will not take enforcement action in certain circumstances. What this amounts to is an 
encouraging regime for innovation from the FCA.  
 
The FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox has been a popular, and successful initiative. In 2016, 24 out 
of 69 applications met the FCA’s criteria for participating in the Sandbox initiative, and were 
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accepted to start testing products.447 In 2017, the FCA received 77 applications from firms to 
participate in the second round of testing in the Regulatory Sandbox.448 It is expected that the 
successful firms will be announced in May 2017. A study of global FinTech centres, conducted 
by EY for HM Treasury, found that the UK has ‘the most supportive regulatory regime’, due in 
part to the ‘supportiveness and accessibility’ of the FCA.449 It is no surprise, therefore, that as 
an increasing number of countries seek to encourage FinTech developments, the FCA’s 
process has become a model for other jurisdictions to follow.450 The FCA has entered a number 
of collaboration agreements with regulators in other countries451 with a view to extending this 
work. There is a desire to use this collaboration to identify common standards to be applied to 
innovation in the sector in order to avoid the risk of a regulatory ‘free for all’ developing.452  
 
However, there are concerns that differing standards are being applied in regulatory approval 
of FinTech products and developments in different jurisdictions.453 Given the international 
nature of banking activities, this is something that needs to be closely monitored. Further, 
banking authorities are not the only bodies developing sandboxes for FinTech testing: there 
are several initiatives that have been introduced at industry level.454 These sandboxes do not 
operate under the purview of the regulator, and therefore do not provide the regulatory 
assistance associated with the initiatives outlined above, however they do provide firms with 
a similar opportunity to test innovative products away from the marketplace. As the FCA has 
emphasised, standards need to be maintained to ensure that innovation is responsible and 
does not compromise consumer protection.455 
 
As indicated above, the Bank of England has its own version of Project Innovate: the FinTech 
Accelerator.456 Whilst operating with a slightly different focus, namely to encourage 
technologies that can assist central banking-related activities, this forms part of the UK’s 
overall FinTech package. In a similar move to the FCA, and to remain abreast of developments 
in this field, the Bank has announced a new ‘FinTech community’, with three objectives: to 
share developments, insights and trends; to enable the Bank to engage with FinTech firms; 
and to provide FinTech firms with networking opportunities.457 While the Bank’s project 
operates on a smaller scale than that of the FCA (the Bank is currently only working with three 
firms), it demonstrates the breadth of FinTech developments taking place in the UK.  
 
An offshoot of the FinTech scene is that of RegTech. RegTech aims to assist financial 
institutions with their compliance obligations, providing technology that can ease or speed up 
the compliance process, thus reducing costs.458 It has been described as ‘the future of financial 
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regulation’.459 As discussed earlier, banking institutions have been increasingly vocal about the 
compliance pressures placed upon them by the current regulatory regime: technology has the 
potential to provide solutions to some of these problems. In this context, RegTech firms have 
identified a need within the market place and are seeking to provide a product or service to 
address that need. It is becoming apparent that technology can be used to automate elements 
of compliance with regulatory requirements: reducing overheads for firms whilst ensuring that 
they are subject to proper regulation.460 Within the industry itself, services are being developed 
to aid the identification of misconduct within institutions,461assist with anti-money laundering 
compliance requirements,462 and rationalise the process of regulatory reporting.463 
 
These developments are being supported by the FCA. The FCA has indicated that it is 
searching for RegTech solutions to a number of current challenges, including those relating to 
regulatory reporting, data sharing and improving the accessibility of its Handbook.464 In 
accordance with this emphasis, the FCA has held a number of ‘TechSprint’ days, designed to 
encourage industry participants to work together on these challenges to ‘help address the cost, 
efficiency and effectiveness of regulatory reporting’.465 
 
These technological developments are positive ones. There have been concerns within the UK 
about the level of competition within the banking sector given the consolidation that took place 
during the financial crisis and about the levels of consumer protection that accompany limited 
competition. FinTech firms have the ability to offer consumers a greater choice, and aim to do 
so with an ease that customers do not believe they experience when dealing with conventional 
banks. FinTech products are more streamlined and intuitive to use.466 From a RegTech 
perspective, given the current pressures to deregulate, the development of products and 
services that can assist banks with their compliance requirements as an alternative to looser 
forms of regulation must also be seen in a positive light. However, that does not mean that 
there are no concerns. Charlotte Hogg, in her previous role as Chief Operating Officer of the 
Bank of England, noted ‘there remain real questions around the potential risks and as yet 
unknown ramifications. As we have seen before, not least during the financial crisis, even the 
tools considered the most advanced analytically at the time may be flawed’.467 The FCA have 
noted the possibility of innovation moving risk from the firm to the consumer, of innovation 
being used to avoid regulatory requirements, and of regulation failing to keep pace with 
technological developments.468  
 
Regulators must pay attention to these risks as the FinTech industry continues to gather pace. 
Innovation brings with it additional risks which are impossible to quantify with accuracy: the 
most obvious being that interconnected innovative technologies might become systemically 
important or might threaten the viability of older established banks. While the majority of 
FinTech issues will fall within the remit of the FCA, given the FCA’s consumer protection and 
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market integrity objectives, the potential for systemic risk also pulls FinTech developments 
directly within the scope of the PRA’s concerns.  
 
This emphasis on new technology poses further challenges for the future of banking 
regulation. Will the authorities have the ability to understand these new products to the extent 
that they can identify how these products or services could pose a threat to financial stability, 
consumer protection or the integrity of the banking sector? Do the authorities have the 
technical expertise to adequately oversee the development and use of FinTech?  
 
Similar questions arise in relation to RegTech, and potentially even more so given the current 
calls for deregulation, or ‘smarter’ regulation. It must be ensured that RegTech does not allow 
firms to evade existing regulatory requirements in exchange for cheaper, or easier, 
compliance. An example of the problems that could arise from defective RegTech can be 
illustrated by the importance the regulators place on cooperative engagement from firms.469  
Both regulators are reliant upon firms providing them with accurate information regarding 
the nature of their business activities, yet a defective algorithm470 or misplaced emphasis in 
RegTech used by firms to control their compliance data has the potential to result in incorrect 
information being transmitted. 
 
The need to improve staff expertise in relation to financial and regulatory technologies has 
been acknowledged, particularly by the FCA, who have indicated their intention for the 
Regulatory Sandbox initiative to provide both developers and regulators with knowledge and 
understanding of the technologies being tested and the risks that could arise from 
innovation.471 This experience, while a valuable one, will only be able improve knowledge in 
relation to the products that are authorised through the FCA’s sandbox scheme. In a world 
where numerous regulators are using the sandbox model, and with multiple financial centres 
vying for the global FinTech title, the UK’s regulators will not be able to monitor all new 
technology. The introduction of industry sandboxes only heightens these concerns. Regulators 
must therefore ensure that they are alert to, and can minimise, these risks.  
 
The risks surrounding Brexit do not disappear in this regard. While FinTech is currently 
operating in a climate of regulatory support, the UK’s exit from the EU poses a threat to the 
continued ability of London to retain FinTech activity. Funding from EU bodies that has, in 
the past, supported London-based FinTech businesses, is already in the process of being 
withdrawn.472 FinTech firms, in the same manner as banks, will also value the single passport 
if they wish to conduct business within the EU. While the current picture surrounding the 
FinTech sector is a positive one, there is every risk that this will not continue to be the case. 
With other financial centres competing aggressively to attract FinTech activity, UK regulatory 
policies need to continue to support and encourage innovation and development if they wish 
to maintain the FinTech momentum. There is a fine line between supportive regulatory policy 
designed to attract businesses and regulation that fails to meet its objectives. Regulators will 
need to monitor this closely to ensure that they have the balance right.  
 
Competition and challenger banks 
The issues discussed thus far in this paper reflect the changing nature of the UK’s banking 
services market. Another important element of this evolution is reflected by the renewed 
                                               
469  Principle 11 of the Principles for Businesses in the FCA’s Handbook states: ‘A firm must deal with its regulators in an 
open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the appropriate regulator appropriately anything relating to the firm of which 
that regulator would reasonably expect notice’. A practically identical provision is found at Fundamental Rule 7 in the PRA’s 
Rulebook: ‘A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way and must disclose to the PRA appropriately 
anything relating to the firm of which the PRA would reasonably expect notice’.  
470  R Krystosek, The Algorithm Made Me Do It and Other Bad Excuses, 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/05/the-algorithm-made-me-do-it-and-other-bad-excuses/. 
471 FCA, ‘Business Plan 2017/18’, April 2017, p 45-46 
472 K Shubber, ‘UK tech investors face loss of significant funding after Brexit’, 10th May 2017.  
https://www.ft.com/content/8fab88be-34c9-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e  
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emphasis on competition within the banking sector473 and the encouragements for ‘challenger’ 
banks to enter the market to compete with established banks. These developments have also 
been stimulated by the political agenda.  Government policy has been strongly supportive of 
the view that enhanced competition and innovation in the banking sector will benefit the UK’s 
productivity. Greater competition should improve the efficiency of banks, increase the 
attractiveness of their products and services and improve customer choice. 
 
The FCA has the promotion of effective competition in financial services markets in the 
interests of consumers as one of its statutory operational objectives.474 The FSMA states that 
in pursuing this objective the Authority may consider, along with other matters, both the ease 
with which new entrants can enter the market, and how far competition is encouraging 
innovation.475 
 
An example of an area of competitive challenge to established banks which is now well 
established is peer to peer lending (P2P).476 To its proponents, this is a new form of lending 
which utilises technology to produce a result which offers attractive terms to both lenders and 
borrowers by directly matching them. It challenges traditional bank lending practices and 
adds competition to the market which benefits consumers. It can make lending available to 
customers who cannot obtain funds from traditional banks. To its critics, P2P offers a model 
which is dependent on investor confidence, uses untested risk processes and has yet to be 
challenged by an economic downturn. 477 It offers lenders a lower level of protection for their 
savings than traditional banks would: it is an accident waiting to happen which needs to be 
subject to greater regulation.478  
 
Increasing competition also involves encouraging FinTech firms to bring innovative products 
onto the market. Familiar high street banking institutions operate on the basis of aging 
infrastructure, minimising their ability to offer truly new and innovative products. With the 
regulators’ encouragement, new businesses have sought to fill this gap and challenge those 
institutions. An important facet of this has been the creation of the ‘New Bank Start-up Unit’, 
a joint PRA and FCA initiative, designed to improve the access of new banks to the UK’s 
banking sector, announced in the July 2015 ‘Productivity Plan’.479  
 
Bank of England statistics indicate that, between April 2013 and April 2016, 14 new banks 
were granted authorisation, with a further 6 applications being considered.480 This number 
increased in the year following. While there are no official statistics on new authorisations over 
the last year, a number of firms have gained permission to operate in the banking sector.481 As 
of March 2016, the PRA had indicated that alongside the 6 new bank applications, there were 
a further 14 new interested applicants.482 It is expected that this figure is now higher.  
 
Prior to the introduction of the New Bank Start-up Unit, potential new entrants to the banking 
sector experienced difficulties accessing the sector and harboured concerns about the 
                                               
473 The current account switching service, which is designed to enhance competition between banks by removing barriers to 
switching, has been in operation since 2013. The FCA has been conducting a review into its effectiveness.  See FCA, Making 
Current Account Switching easier, 2015 and Our response to the CMA’s final report on its investigation into competition in the 
retail banking market, 2016. 
474 FSMA s 1B(3)(c). 
475 FSMA s 1E(2)(d) and (e). 
476 FCA, Call for input to the post-implementation review of the FCA’s crowdfunding rules, July 2016 (p 20) states that in 2014 
P2P lending to small businesses was 12% of that of established banks.  In 2012 it had been 1%. 
477 Financial Stability Board, Committee of the Global Financial System, FinTech credit 
Market structure, business models and financial stability implications, 2017. http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/CGFS-
FSB-Report-on-FinTech-Credit.pdf. 
478 Some regulation of P2P lending now exists in the CONC section of the FCA Handbook. It is aimed at the protection of borrowers 
rather than lenders. P2P platforms are also now required to meet minimum capital requirements. 
479 HM Treasury, ‘Fixing the foundations: creating a more prosperous nation’, Cm 9098, July 2015 p 12 
480 Bank of England: Prudential Regulation Authority, Annual Competition Report 2016, p 16.  
481 The PRA’s list of banks, published on a monthly basis, indicates that 6 banks have been added to this list between April 2016 
and April 2017. See: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/authorisations/banksbuildingsocietieslist.aspx  
482 Bank of England: Prudential Regulation Authority, Annual Competition Report 2016, p 16 
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regulatory requirements for authorisation. Before authorisation can be granted new entrants 
must be able to demonstrate that they meet the requirements for authorisation set out by the 
PRA and FCA (termed Threshold Conditions)483 and, further, that they will be able to meet 
these requirements on an ongoing basis. The Threshold Conditions can operate as a barrier 
for new entrants, requiring potential banks to demonstrate that they have the appropriate 
infrastructure in place as well as the necessary financial resources.484 Firms therefore have to 
engage in a high level of expenditure, securing IT systems and executive-level staff, for 
example, before they are authorised, without the assurance that they will obtain authorisation 
at the end of the process. 
 
The New Bank Start-up Unit485 aims to address these concerns, and ease the authorisation 
process for new entrants by guiding new banks through the various stages of the process. 
Potential new banks have the opportunity to meet with the regulators at the pre-application 
stage, and a new ‘mobilisation’ stage has also been introduced in the authorisation timeline,486 
providing new entrants with the opportunity to gain authorisation at an earlier point than 
previously available.  
 
Mobilisation addresses some of the concerns that new banks experienced under the previous 
authorisation process. It allows banks to start operating before the ‘full’ bank set-up is in place 
and before the new bank has met all Threshold Conditions, providing the certainty that if the 
Threshold Conditions are met within 12 months of entering the mobilisation stage, 
authorisation will be granted. New banks will therefore be able to start to trade (albeit with 
restrictions on their activities, such as limits on the amount of deposits they can accept) if they 
can demonstrate to the regulators that they have met all essential requirements and have the 
ability to meet the Threshold Conditions within 12 months.487  
 
This development is a positive one for new entrants: it enables them to develop their business 
by acquiring further investment and staff, building IT systems and contracting with external 
suppliers secure in the knowledge that they will be fully authorised to trade in due course.  
 
However, these developments present challenges for banking regulation in two ways. First, 
existing banking institutions are likely to experience difficulties in keeping pace with a rapidly 
evolving, competitive, market. Second, new market entrants need to be able to compete 
effectively on entry to the marketplace to provide that competition. As with the other issues 
raised in this paper, this requires a careful balancing of regulatory policy and supervision: 
regulators need to maintain existing banks whilst creating a supportive environment for new 
ones.  
 
First, the new challenges for existing banking institutions. The phrase ‘challenger bank’ has 
become so ubiquitous in the banking regulation arena that the Oxford English Dictionary 
provides a definition of the term: ‘a relatively small retail bank set up with the intention of 
competing for business with large long-established national banks’.488 Challenger banks, 
however, are institutions of varying structures and sizes. They can range from new entrant 
full-service firms offering consumers the complete range of banking products and services 
(such as Metro Bank, for example), through to a specialised institution offering a particular 
                                               
483 For a summary of the Threshold Condition requirements, see: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/authorisations/newfirmauths/thresholdconditionsfactsheet.pdf  
484 For detail on the content of the Threshold Conditions, as well as the PRA’s approach to the operation of the Threshold 
Conditions, see: PRA, ‘The PRA’s approach to banking supervision’, June 2016, p 12-18. Available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/praapproach/bankingappr1603.pdf   
485 Bank of England, ‘New Bank Start-up Unit’, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/nbsu/Pages/default.aspx  
486 Bank of England, ‘New Bank Start-up Unit: Mobilisation’,  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/nbsu/Pages/mobilisation.aspx  
487 The PRA set out the activities that can be deferred during the mobilisation stage in ‘A review of requirements for firms entering 
into or expanding in the banking sector: one year on’, July 2014 
488 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘challenger bank’, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/challenger_bank 
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product or service to a particular type of consumer, or consumers in a particular area, or in a 
specific manner.489 
 
These institutions are seeking to challenge the status quo in the sector, attracting consumers 
from more established firms by offering products and services to consumers in a novel way 
that meets consumer need. Yet, alongside the challenge represented by increased competition, 
incumbent banks are also having to address the FinTech challenge. Banks are still considered 
to have a poor public image as a result of the financial crisis and the subsequent conduct issues, 
and consumers do not always feel that existing banks provide them with products or services 
that meet their expectations. Challenger banks and FinTech firms are seeking to exploit this 
sentiment. 
 
Existing banks therefore need to improve the quality of the products and service they offer, as 
well as the ease of access to those products. Yet, banks are likely to experience challenges in 
doing so. Incumbent banks are dealing with legacy IT systems that are difficult to update and 
costly to replace. On top of this, some banks are still working on incorporating different IT 
systems acquired as a result of the mergers that took place during the financial crisis. These 
aging IT systems impede the ability of big banks to compete on technology and product 
offerings: to do so is considered to be too risky by some institutions. FinTech firms and 
challenger banks are vying to fill this gap and offer new and innovative products and services 
where existing banks do not.  There may come a time when legacy systems put an existing 
bank at risk. The FCA has acknowledged this as a problem. Feedback to the FCA’s ‘Our 
Mission’ consultation highlighted comments from respondents warning the FCA to ensure an 
appropriate balance between ‘old’ business models and newer ones.490 The FCA has also 
announced a review into the business models of retail banks, given the significant challenges 
facing incumbent institutions, in part focusing on ‘how changes in economic, technological, 
social and regulatory factors are impacting retail banking business models’.491 While there is 
limited evidence of consumers switching from their current banks to ‘challengers’, as 
awareness of alternatives grow, there is every possibility that consumers will do so.  
 
The second issue revolves around challenges for the ‘challenger’ institutions. Whilst the New 
Bank Start-up Unit provides applicants with assistance throughout the process of starting the 
business of being a bank and getting authorised, new banks are still experiencing difficulties 
after they have received authorisation. PwC highlighted the difficulties faced by new banks in 
a detailed report on the development of the challenger bank market within the UK.492 PwC 
highlight several key difficulties for challenger banks: including the cost of compliance, capital 
levels, access to payment systems and data, and improving customer awareness.493 It is argued 
that the requirements for challenger banks to comply with the same regulations as larger 
banks results in challenger institutions having disproportionately high costs compared with 
established institutions because of the size of their compliance departments.494 This is 
impacting on the ability of challengers to develop their brand or commit resources to 
innovation. PwC highlight support for the view that ‘the regulator should focus on enabling 
smaller players to take risks that will have a smaller impact – and even if they fail, such 
exercises provide learning opportunities for the industry.’495 Further, capital levels are an issue 
for new institutions.496 Two approaches are used within the UK to determine the capital 
                                               
489 e.g., Aldermore Bank focuses on Small and Medium sized enterprises; Monzo offers a ‘mobile first’ bank; Atom Bank is also a 
digital-only bank; and, Hampshire Community Bank offers banking services to those in the locality.  For an overview of UK 
‘challenger’ banks (incorporating FinTech start-ups), see: http://www.bankingtech.com/570702/uk-challenger-banks-whos-
who-and-whats-their-tech/  
490 FCA, ‘Our Mission 2017: Feedback Statement’, FS17/1, April 2017, p 37. 
491 FCA, Strategic review of retail banking business models, 11th May 2017 https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-
reviews/strategic-review-retail-banking-business-models.   
492 PwC, ‘Who are you calling a ‘challenger bank’?’ March 2017. https://www.pwc.co.uk/industries/banking-capital-
markets/insights/challenger-banks.htm. 
493 ibid, p 3. 
494 ibid, p 15. 
495 ibid, p 15. 
496 ibid, p 12. 
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requirements for banks: the Internal-Ratings Based (IRB) approach and the Standardised 
Approach (SA), yet for banks to be able to use their own internal-ratings based models they 
need to provide a significant amount of information to the regulator. The time and cost 
demands of this process has meant that new banks operate on the basis of SA, however this 
approach results in banks using SA holding proportionately more capital than those on IRB 
(only used by the UK’s six largest banks). This is also restricting the ability of challenger banks 
to compete effectively.497 The PRA is currently consulting on the operation of the IRB and SA 
models498 and have demonstrated that they are aware of the potential for imbalances,499 but it 
is clear that there is still work to do to remove barriers for new entrants. 
 
Access to payment systems forms the third area of concern for challenger institutions. The 
UK’s payment systems are currently privately owned and controlled by existing market 
players, and, as such, operate to limit access to retail systems. The Payment Services Regulator 
(PSR), a body launched in 2015 with the objectives of promoting competition and innovation 
in payment systems whilst promoting the interests of those who use or rely on those systems,500 
is aware of the problems surrounding direct access to essential infrastructure, and has 
identified this as a ‘top priority’ in the work it is conducting.501 It has stated its intention to 
enable payment service providers (including challenger banks) to be able to access payment 
systems ‘on a fair, open and transparent basis’.502 The Payment Strategy Forum, an industry 
panel set up by the PSR to develop strategy and encourage innovation, has identified the issue 
of access as central to its strategy,503 and the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) work 
on retail banking is also expected to have a positive impact on the ability of challengers to gain 
access to payment systems and data.504  
 
The Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2)505 should be implemented in the UK in January 
2018. The introduction of this Directive, in the form of the Payment Services Regulations 2017, 
should improve the way that banks and other payment service institutions (thus incorporating 
appropriately authorised FinTech firms) access payment systems and share data.506 Regulation 
103 will introduce a prohibition on restrictive rules governing access to payment systems, 
ensuring that, amongst other objectives, these rules do not ‘prevent, restrict or inhibit access 
more than is necessary to: (a) safeguard against specific risks such as settlement risk, 
operational risk or business risk; or (b) protect the stability of the payment system;’507 or 
restrict users from participating in other payment systems.508 As the PwC report highlights, it 
is expected that this will be a positive development for challenger institutions and should 
reduce the cost and complexity of gaining access to payment systems.  
 
However, PSD2 does not only impact access, it will also have a significant impact on the way 
that ‘big data’ and information is exchanged between payment service providers. 
                                               
497 G Shone, Is the UK mortgage market a level playing field for new banks? http://banknxt.com/60808/mortgage-market-
new-banks/. 
498 See PRA, ‘Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach: clarifying PRA expectations’, CP 5/17, March 2017. Concerns surrounding 
the potential imbalances between the IRB and SA models have also resulted in the PRA consulting on the operation of its Pillar 
2A capital requirements. PRA, ‘Refining the PRA’s Pillar 2A capital framework’, CP3/17, February 2017.  
499 M Stewart, ‘‘Harrowing the ploughed field’ – Refining the standardized capital regime’, Speech given 3 March 2017 
500 See sections 40-52 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.  
501 PSR, ‘Access’, https://www.psr.org.uk/psr-focus/access.  
502 PSR, ‘Factsheet: Access and governance report 2017’, No.171. Available at: 
https://www.psr.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/PDF/Access-Governance-2017-Factsheet.pdf  
503 Payment Strategy Forum, ‘A Payments Strategy for the 21st Century: Putting the needs of users first’, November 2016, p 5 
504 Gov.uk, ‘Press release: CMA paves the way for Open Banking revolution’, 9th August 2016, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-paves-the-way-for-open-banking-revolution.  
505 EU Directive 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market.  
506 The PSR has stressed that PSD2 might require changes to its approach on access to payment systems. PSR, ‘Access and 
governance report on payment systems: update on progress and areas for ongoing focus’, March 2017, p 31. 
507 Regulation 103(1)(b) Payment Services Regulations 2017. Regulation 2 of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 defines 
‘payment service providers’ as including authorised payment institutions, small payment institutions and registered account 
information service providers, among others.  
508 Regulation 103(1)(3)(a) Payment Services Regulations 2017. Regulation 103 does not amount to a requirement to allow all 
payment service providers access to the system. This acknowledges the commercial risks involved. It does, however, does set out 
the framework within which access to payment systems should be considered.  
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Developments in this area are not solely the responsibility of the PSR, but also build on work 
conducted by the CMA509 and the Open Banking Working Group,510 in consultation with the 
industry.511 They have culminated in an ‘Open Banking Application Programming Interface 
Standard’ (the Open Banking API Standard): an industry-wide standard setting out the 
framework on how banking software should require authentication, enable access to data and 
direct payments. Banks are required to comply with this Standard by January 2018, to coincide 
with the implementation of PSD2, although some delays in meeting this target are expected.  
 
The Open Banking API Standard means that firms offering services that require information 
on how individual consumers use their accounts will be able to access this data from banks 
(with the appropriate consent from the consumer) in order to provide the consumer with a 
service tailored to their needs512 and greater choice in their financial dealings. This opens the 
possibility of all banking institutions (including challenger banks and FinTech firms) 
enhancing the quality of their offerings to consumers on the basis of the new data they will 
have available.513   
 
Within the UK, the movements towards ‘open banking’ dovetail with a number of 
developments affecting the sector. The CMA view open banking as a way to improve levels of 
customer service and competition; open banking ensures compliance with the PSD2; and, it 
accords with the current political emphasis on innovation, challenger banks and FinTech 
within the sector. However, developments in this area do need to be monitored. Mark Carney 
has stated that they could ‘signal the end of universal banking as we know it’.514 There are 
concerns that the construction of the Open Banking API Standard will impede the ability of 
FinTech firms, and potentially some challenger banks, to access the data they require to 
compete directly with incumbent banking institutions. Further, existing challenger and 
FinTech firms might have to reform business models and technology to operate in accordance 
with the new standard.515  
 
There should also be concern as to potential issues arising in the future: confidentiality 
questions are bound to be posed when consumers grant consent for their financial data to be 
used in a particular way. Questions also need to be asked about who is accountable in the event 
that there is a technological breakdown, or a cyberattack: the bank account provider, or the 
challenger/FinTech firm accessing the information or providing the ‘add on’ to the existing 
                                               
509 Gov.uk, ‘Press release: CMA paves the way for Open Banking revolution’, 9th August 2016. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-paves-the-way-for-open-banking-revolution.  
510 Open Banking Working Group, ‘The Open Banking Standard: Unlocking the potential of open banking to improve 
competition, efficiency and stimulate innovation’, 8th February 2016. https://theodi.org/open-banking-standard.  
511 Nine banks (AIB Group, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Danske, HSBC Group, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide, RBS Group and 
Santander), FinTech firms and industry leaders have been involved in the process of developing the Standard. 
512 CMA, ‘Making banks work harder for you’, 9th August 2016. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544942/overview-of-the-banking-retail-
market.pdf.  
513 The CMA remedy for ‘Open Banking’ only applies to business and personal current accounts, however the HM Treasury 
consultation on the implementation and draft Payment Services Regulations 2017 goes further than this, intending the Open 
Banking API Standard to apply to all online payment accounts. See, HM Treasury, ‘Implementation of the revised EU Payment 
Services Directive II’, February 2017, p 36 
514 M Carney, ‘The Promise of FinTech – Something New Under the Sun?’, Speech to the Deutsche Bundesbank G20 conference 
on ‘Digitising finance, financial inclusion and financial literacy, 25th January 2017 p 11. 
515 These issues are currently at the centre of a debate currently taking place at the EU level – with the European Banking 
Federation seeking to amend PSD2 to incorporate a ban on a practice known as ‘screen scraping’ whereby consumers grant 
FinTech firms permission to access data by handing over confidential banking information necessary to use the service. It has 
been argued that this practice should be banned because it creates confidentiality and cyber security issues. FinTech firms have 
considered this to be an attempt by banks to limit their ability to compete and to innovate by changing the operation of the API 
standards and the Regulatory Technical Standards that will accompany PSD2 (not yet agreed but to be implemented 18 months 
after the final version is published). This episode highlights the difficulties of the debate surrounding competition and innovation 
in the sector itself. The general consensus appears to be that developments in the UK are less likely to be affected by this debate 
given the content of the Open Banking API Standard, but there are still likely to be problems surrounding the implementation 
and operation of the UK’s standard. For an excellent podcast on this issue, see: FinTech Insider, FS:11, ‘Ep 250 – If you Liked It 
Then You Should’ve Put A Blockchain On It’, first broadcast 15th May 2017.  See also: A Peyton, ‘European banks call for EC 
support on screen scraping ban’, 16th May 2017. http://www.bankingtech.com/836582/european-banks-call-for-ec-support-on-
screen-scraping-ban/ and, The Finanser, ‘FinTech versus banks, round one: PSD2’, May 2017, 
https://thefinanser.com/2017/05/fintech-versus-banks-round-one-psd2.html/  
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service? The Open Banking Working Group have suggested the introduction of an 
independent authority to ensure that standards are met, and to compile a ‘white list’ of firms 
that have been vetted.516 This has introduced yet another area of concern from new firms: that 
existing banking institutions will use this list to restrict access to consumers. It is thus evident 
that this is, and will continue to be, a controversial development, and one that regulators need 
to keep abreast of.   
 
The overarching challenge for challenger banks is that of resilience. Despite the positive 
developments taking place in this area, there are likely to be difficulties ahead. For new 
banking institutions to survive, the regulatory regime needs to balance the interests of existing 
banks and new entrants whilst ensuring that the objectives of the regulatory regime are met. 
There are a significant number of new institutions entering the retail banking market place, 
and with the existence of the challenges highlighted above, talk of reconsolidation to enable 
smaller banks to upscale and target particular market niches is beginning to arise.517 The 
pressures on business development and compliance within challenger banks have placed them 
in a difficult situation, and they are likely to find their position in the market squeezed with 
the advent of the implementation of the Payment Services Regulations II and Open Banking. 
Whilst some of these institutions might be better placed to deal with technological advances 
than incumbent banking institutions, these technological developments also raise the classic 
problem of unknown unknowns: problems that have not yet been identified. A market 
consolidation is to be expected, but if new banks and innovative firms are to be able to truly 
compete, addressing the hurdles in this area needs to be a priority. 
 
Cybercrime 
Intrinsically connected to developments across the banking sector are the challenges posed by 
cybercrime. In a recent podcast focusing on FinTech issues, Eileen Burbidge noted the risks 
arising from cybercrime as one of the potential crisis areas for FinTech.518 The advent of Open 
Banking introduces a new set of security risks. Cybercrime presents a major ongoing challenge 
for both regulators and banks. Banks hold commercially sensitive data on their customers 
which must be protected519 and, as the RBS Group IT failure of 2012520 illustrated, there is a risk 
that a denial of service attack will render all or parts of the payments system inoperative. 
Larger banks are often struggling to keep their IT systems up to date521 and an increased 
reliance on widely distributed technology also increases the challenge of protecting the 
financial sector from cyber risks.  
 
The ‘WannaCrypt0r 2.0’ ransomware attack in May 2017 highlighted the threat that 
cybercrime poses for institutions. Whilst it does not appear that any UK banks were affected, 
the attack caused disruption on a global scale – affecting businesses and organisations in at 
least 74 countries.522 Within the UK, the NHS was significantly affected as computers were 
                                               
516 Open Data Institute, ‘Introducing the Open Banking Standard’, 2016, p 10. https://theodi.org/open-banking-standard. 
517 B Martin, ‘Upstart challenger banks eye consolidation’, 7th May 2017, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/05/07/upstart-challenger-banks-eye-consolidation/. 
518 BBC Radio 4, ‘The Bottom Line: FinTech’, podcast initially broadcast 16th March 2017. 
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08hpwbz. 
519 For a recent failure to do this, see the case of Tesco Bank discussed by A Charlesworth and K Stanton, Tesco Bank and 
Cybercrime, http://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2016/11/tesco-bank-and-cybercrime/.  
520 This was not a case of cybercrime but it does show the disruption that a successful denial of service attack could cause to the 
payments system. Internal IT failures within the banks resulted in approximately 6.5 million customers (ie 10% of the UK 
population) encountering difficulty in accessing their accounts for up to six days. This inevitably had a knock on effect on non-
customers whom the customers were dealing with. The regulators imposed penalties totalling £56 million on the banks in respect 
of these failures. See PRA, Final Notice, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, National Westminster Bank Plc, Ulster Bank Ltd, 20th 
November 2014, and FCA Final Notice, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, National Westminster Bank Plc, Ulster Bank Ltd, 20th 
November 2014.  
521 M Arnold, T Braithwaite, Banks’ Ageing IT Systems Buckle under Strain, Financial Times, June 18th 2015, 
https://www.ft.com/content/90360dbe-15cb-11e5-a58d-00144feabdc0;   FCA, ‘Business Plan 2016/17’, April 2016, p 22 
522 The Guardian, ‘Accidental hero’ halts ransomware attack and warns: this is not over’, 13th May 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/13/accidental-hero-finds-kill-switch-to-stop-spread-of-ransomware-
cyber-attack. 
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rendered inaccessible and staff were unable to access patient data 523 Numerous banking 
institutions took steps to strengthen their online security in the weekend after the 
cyberattack,524 but it is not difficult to envisage the problems an attack on this scale could cause 
for banking institutions and global financial stability, especially if confidential banking data 
were to be leaked, or if the payments system were to be affected. The threat posed by 
cybercrime will only continue to increase as attackers become more sophisticated and 
technological developments, such as the ‘internet of things,’ open new ways of routing an 
attack.  
 
This is not an area in which there are calls for deregulation. Indeed, the regulators already 
possess adequate tools to deal with failures to take proper precautions.525 However, cybercrime 
presents a practical challenge for regulators seeking to ensure that a large financial services 
industry is alive to constantly evolving risks. 
 
The FCA’s approach in this area is a three pronged proactive one under which firms are 
expected to get the basics right. This includes: having a good backup strategy, one which 
enables data to be easily restored, in place;526 developing a ‘secure culture’ amongst staff in 
order to ensure that individuals do not undermine the bank’s efforts to ensure security and 
cooperating by sharing information about risks with others in the industry. The FCA has 
established a number of Cyber Coordination groups with the aim of improving understanding 
of the risks in this area. It is hoped that a sharing of solutions will increase the resilience of 
firms in the face of attacks. The FCA is also collaborating actively on the issue with regulators 
in other countries.527 
 
Conclusion 
The 2008 crash was a trauma for banks, their regulators and society in general. The lessons 
that were learned in a hard way about the risks that light touch regulation of banks can create 
for the whole economy must not be forgotten.  
 
Progress has been made. The UK’s banking sector is regularly claimed to be more capable of 
withstanding a severe shock nowadays than it was in 2008. Significant moves have been made 
to improve the culture in banks, albeit that it is still unclear how effective these will be. 
 
However, politicians and regulators must appreciate that times have moved on and that new 
risks which need to be confronted have emerged. The political climate has changed radically 
and technology continues to advance. The period following the crisis witnessed strong support 
for enhanced global banking standards. Emerging free market politics in countries which are 
actively seeking to protect national interests may well pose a threat to this consensus. In 
addition, emerging technologies and cybercrime continue to pose new questions for 
regulators. In particular, as the technology under development is unlikely to be confined by 
national frontiers the choice is between global regulatory standards and regulatory arbitrage.  
 
Whether what is being done is sufficient to protect the banking system against new and 
currently unforeseen risks remains to be seen. The next financial crisis is highly unlikely to 
resemble a previous one. What is clear is that political decisions to reduce the level of 
                                               
523 S Neville, ‘NHS fights to restore services after global hack’, 13th May 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/fa5ed73a-37e7-11e7-
ac89-b01cc67cfeec  
524 J O’Donnell and A Winning, ‘Banks reinforce cyber defences after global attack’, 15th May 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-banks-idUSKCN18B2A3  
525 PRA Rulebook, Fundamental Rules 5 and 6. FCA Handbook Principles for Businesses Principle 3. 
526 It is said that the majority of security breaches involve a small number of vulnerabilities, most of which are known and could 
be eliminated by use of available fixes.  Delfas, fn 175 below and the Government sponsored Cyber Essentials scheme at 
https://www.cyberaware.gov.uk/cyberessentials/.  
527 N Delfas, ‘Expect the unexpected’ - cyber security - 2017 and beyond, Speech at the Financial Information Security Network. 
24th April 2017, https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/expect-unexpected-cyber-security-2017-and-beyond. 
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regulation in order to benefit the economy should not be taken without a full appraisal of the 
possible impact on the economy of such deregulation in a variety of (possibly unlikely) 
circumstances. On the other hand, the view that the current model of supervision of banks 
must continue unaltered should not go unquestioned. Today’s consensus may well be 
tomorrow’s fallacy. The rules which have emerged since 2008 may well require rethinking and 
modification in the light of technological change.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
